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IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
by
Pablito C. Lake
The objective of this thesis is to detect malfunctioning sensors in wireless sensor
networks. The ability to detect abnormality is critical to the security of any sensor
network. However, the ability to detect a faulty wireless sensor is not trivial. Controlled
repeatable experiments are difficult in wireless channels. A Redhat Linux 7.0 Wireless
Emulation Dynamic Switch software was used to solve this problem.
Six nodes were configured with a node acting as a base station. The nodes were
all part of a cell. This means that every node could communicate with all other nodes. A
client-server program simulated the background traffic. Another program simulated a
faulty node. A node was isolated as the faulty node while all other nodes were good.
The experiment ran for several hours and the data was captured with tcpdump. The data
was analyzed to conclusions based on a statistical comparison of good node versus bad
node.
The statistical delay on the good node was an average of 0.69 ms while the
standard deviation was 0.49. This was much better than the delay on the bad node that
was 0.225192 s with a standard deviation of 0.89. This huge difference in the delay
indicated that the faulty node was detected statistically. A threshold value of 1 ms was
chosen. The good node was within this value about 98 % of the time. The bad node on
the other hand was far out of this range and was definitely detected. The channel
utilization data provided the same conclusion.
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The objective of this thesis is to detect malfunctioning sensors in wireless sensor
networks. At this point in the discussion it serves well to define the term "malfunction".
According to the Oxford Dictionary the term malfunction means "failure to function
normally". Therefore, there are many situations that determine whether a sensor is
malfunctioning. The following bullets give some examples of a malfunctioning sensor:
• Sensor is hacked into by an unauthorized person
• Sensor reporting erroneous data because of hardware or software problem
• Sensor reporting erroneous data due to extreme environmental conditions
• Sensor exhausting its energy supply
• Sensor physically damaged by an individual
These instances cover a wide variety of situations responsible for the abnormal behavior
of sensors. The ability to detect the above circumstances is critical to the security of any
sensor network. Although this is true, the ability to detect a faulty wireless sensor is not
trivial since the possibilities for abnormality are endless and the wireless medium's
performance is difficult to predict and or control.
The wireless channels properties include low bandwidth, high delay, high bit-
error rates, power and distance tradeoffs, and high packet drop rates. The erratic
behavior of these characteristics makes it difficult to conduct controlled research and
experimentation towards predicting, with reasonable accuracy, the malfunctioning of
1
2sensors in a wireless sensor network. Thus, this thesis takes advantage of a Linux
software switch to study the malfunctioning of sensors in a simulated wireless
environment where some parameters are controlled.
1.2 Background Information
So, what is a sensor? A sensor is a device that communicates a physical change in the
environment such as radiation or temperature. Sensors are by no means new. However,
they are creating a buzz commercially and in research communities. This increased
interest spurred out of two major technological revolutions. The first was the connection
of sensors to computer systems and the second was the emergence of small, inexpensive
and highly reliable micro electronic and mechanical systems (MEMS) [8]. The idea of the
dynamic topology of wireless ad-hoc networks is also a driving force behind the great
deal of commercial and research interest. "Furthermore, integration of inexpensive,
power efficient and reliable sensors in nodes of wireless ad-hoc networks, with
significant computational and communication resources, opens new research and
engineering vistas" [8].
A typical sensor, like the TinyOS Sensor Mote, is equipped with a 4 MHz
microprocessor with 512 bytes of RAM and 8 KB of code space, a 917 MHz RFM radio
running at 10 kbps, and 32 KB of EEPROM [6]. The radio hardware has a single channel
with half duplex communication. An AA battery pack powers this device. The sensor's
effective lifespan is proportional to its power supply. The energy consumed while
transmitting and receiving bits of information and computing and processing data
depletes the power supply. The average amount of energy needed to send or receive
3information a bit of is about 4000 nanojoules. These characteristics of a typical senor
show that a sensor is quite limited in energy, radio range and memory. Such limited
resources are attributed to the low cost of sensors. Wireless sensor networks, a special
class of ad-hoc networks, efficiently use high node density with keen attention to energy
consumption [9]. A sensor in a high-density wireless sensor network operates for about
five to ten years.
The limitations on a wireless sensor network include enough battery power to supply
all sensor nodes, sufficient memory to store cryptographic keys, and means for
communicating with outside networks. Sensor applications have limited local exchange
and data processing that fall into three categories:
1. Node to base station communication, e.g. sensor readings
2. Base station to node communication, e.g. specific requests
3. Base station to all nodes e.g. queries or reprogramming of the entire network.
The security goal is to address these communication patterns. Generally, the sensor
networks may be deployed in non-trusted locations. The integrity of the each node can
be realized through dedicated secure micro controllers. However, individual sensors still
cannot be trusted! Wireless communication is fundamentally untrustworthy! Any
adversary can eavesdrop on the traffic, and inject new messages or replay and change old
messages because of the traffic's broadcast nature. Hence, one cannot place any trust
assumptions on the communication infrastructure, except that messages are delivered to
the destination with non-zero probability.
The security of sensors is categorized into four main requirements — (1) Data
Confidentiality, (2) Data Authentication, (3) Data Integrity and (4) Data Freshness [10].
4Data Confidentiality is concerned with data leaking from a sensor to an unintended
recipient. Data Authentication allows the recipient to verify that the data did indeed
come from the claimed sender [101 Data Integrity ensures the receiver that the data was
not tampered with on its route. Data Freshness means that the data is recently sent. The
above requirements of a sensor make an effort to provide various levels of security to a
wireless sensor network. They are taken into consideration when one is designing an
Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The methods of dealing with the four requirements for
sensor security are explained in the following paragraphs.
Data Confidentiality — A sensor network should not leak sensor readings to the
neighboring networks. In many applications the nodes communicate highly sensitive
data. The standard solution to keep sensitive data secret is to encrypt the data with a
secret key that only the intended receivers possess, hence achieving confidentiality. If
necessary, one can use initially set up secure channels between nodes and base stations to
bootstrap other secure channels given the observed communication patterns.
Data Authentication — Message authentication is of paramount importance for
many applications in sensor networks. Within the building sensor network, authentication
is necessary for many administrative tasks (e.g. network reprogramming or controlling
sensor node duty cycle). At the same time, an adversary can easily inject messages, so
the receiver needs to make sure that the data used in any decision-making process
originated from the correct source. Informally, data authentication allows the receiver to
verify that the claimed sender really sent the data. In the two-party communication case,
data authentication can be achieved through a purely symmetric mechanism: The sender
and the receiver share a secret key to compute a message authentication code (MAC) of
5all communicated data. When a message with a correct MAC arrives, the receiver knows
that the sender must have sent it. This style of authentication cannot be applied to a
broadcast setting without placing much stronger trust assumptions on the network nodes.
It is insecure for one sender to send authentic data to mutually non-trusted receivers using
a symmetric MAC: Any one of the receivers knows the MAC key, and hence could
impersonate the sender and forge messages to other receivers. Hence, one needs an
asymmetric mechanism to achieve authenticated broadcast.
Data Integrity -- In communication, data integrity ensures the receiver that an
adversary does not alter the received data in transit [10]. This can be achieved through
data authentication, which is a stronger property. Therefore, data integrity is a subset of
data authentication.
Data Freshness — Given that all sensor networks stream some forms of time
varying measurements, it is not enough to guarantee confidentiality and authentication;
one also must ensure each message is fresh. Informally, data freshness implies that the
data is recent, and it ensures that no adversary replayed old messages. There are two
types of freshness: weak freshness, which provides partial message ordering, but carries
no delay information, and strong freshness, which provides a total order on a request-
response pair, and allows for delay estimation. Weak freshness is required by sensor
measurements, while strong freshness is useful for time synchronization within the
network.
CHAPTER 2
INTRUSION DECTECTION SYSTEM (IDS)
2.1 Types and Analysis of IDS
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are software or hardware systems that automate the
process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer system or network, analyzing
them for signs of security problems [1]. As network attacks have increased in number and
severity over the past few years, Intrusion Detection Systems have become a necessary
addition to the security infrastructure of most organizations. This Chapter is intended as a
primer in intrusion detection, developed for those who need to understand what security
goals intrusion detection mechanisms serve, how to select and configure intrusion
detection systems for their specific system and network environments, how to manage the
output of intrusion detection systems, and how to integrate intrusion detection functions
with the rest of the organizational security infrastructure. There are many publicly
available information sources for the reader who requires specialized or more detailed
advice on specific intrusion detection issues.
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the events occurring in a
computer system or network and analyzing them for signs of intrusions, defined as
attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, availability, or to bypass the
security mechanisms of a computer or network. Intrusions are caused by attackers
accessing the systems from the Internet, authorized users of the systems who attempt to
gain additional privileges for which they are not authorized, and authorized users who
6
7misuse the privileges given to them. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are software or
hardware that automate this monitoring and analysis process.
Intrusion detection allows organizations to protect their systems from the threats
that come with increasing network connectivity and reliance on information systems.
Given the level and nature of modern network security threats, the question for security
professionals should not be whether to use intrusion detection, but which intrusion
detection features and capabilities to use. IDSs have gained acceptance as a necessary
addition to every organization's security infrastructure. Despite the documented
contributions intrusion detection technologies make to system security, in many
organizations one must still justify the acquisition of IDSs. There are several compelling
reasons to acquire and use IDSs [ 1 ]:
• To prevent problem behaviors by increasing the perceived risk of discovery and
punishment for those who would attack or otherwise abuse the system,
• To detect attacks and other security violations that are not prevented by other
security measures
• To detect and deal with the preambles to attacks (commonly experienced as
network probes and other "doorknob rattling" activities)
• To document the existing threat to an organization
• To act as quality control for security design and administration, especially of large
and complex enterprises
• To provide useful information about intrusions that do take place, allowing
improved diagnosis, recovery, and correction of causative factors
8A fundamental goal of computer security management is to affect the behavior of
individual users in a way that protects information systems from security problems.
Intrusion Detection Systems help organizations accomplish this goal by increasing the
perceived risk of discovery and punishment of attackers. This serves as a significant
deterrent to those who would violate security policy.
Attackers, using widely publicized techniques, can gain unauthorized access to
many, if not most systems, especially those connected to public networks. This often
happens when known vulnerabilities in the systems are not corrected. Although vendors
and administrators are encouraged to address vulnerabilities lest they enable attacks, there
are many situations in which this is not possible [1]:
• In many legacy systems, the operating systems cannot be patched or updated.
• Even in systems in which patches can be applied, administrators sometimes have
neither sufficient time nor resource to track and install all the necessary patches.
This is a common problem, especially in environments that include a large
number of hosts or a wide range of different hardware or software environments.
• Users can have compelling operational requirements for network services and
protocols that are known to be vulnerable to attack.
• Both users and administrators make errors in configuring and using systems.
• In configuring system access control mechanisms to reflect an organization's
procedural computer use policy, discrepancies almost always occur. These
disparities allow legitimate users to perform actions that are ill advised or that
overstep their authorization.
9In an ideal world, commercial software vendors would minimize vulnerabilities in
their products, and user organizations would correct all reported vulnerabilities quickly
and reliably. However, in the real world, this seldom happens thanks to our reliance on
commercial software where new flaws and vulnerabilities are discovered on a daily basis.
Given this state of affairs, intrusion detection can represent an excellent approach to
protecting a system. An IDS can detect when an attacker has penetrated a system by
exploiting an uncorrected or uncorrectable flaw. Furthermore, it can serve an important
function in system protection, by bringing the fact that the system has been attacked to
the attention of the administrators who can contain and recover any damage that results.
This is far preferable to simply ignoring network security threats where one allows the
attackers continued access to systems and the information on them.
When adversaries attack a system, they typically do so in predictable stages. The first
stage of an attack is usually probing or examining a system or network, searching for an
optimal point of entry. In systems with no IDS, the attacker is free to thoroughly
examine the system with no risk of discovery or retribution. Given this unfettered access,
a determined attacker will eventually find a vulnerability in such a network and exploit it
to gain entry to various systems. The same network with an IDS monitoring its
operations presents a much more formidable challenge to that attacker. Although the
attacker may probe the network for weaknesses, the IDS will observe the probes, will
identify them as suspicious, may actively block the attacker's access to the target system,
and will alert security personnel who can then take appropriate actions to block
subsequent access by the attacker. Even the presence of a reaction to the attacker's
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probing of the network will elevate the level of risk the attacker perceives, discouraging
further attempts to target the network.
When you are drawing up a budget for network security, it often helps to substantiate
claims that the network is likely to be attacked or is even currently under attack.
Furthermore, understanding the frequency and characteristics of attacks allows one to
understand what security measures are appropriate to protect the network against those
attacks. IDSs verify, itemize, and characterize the threat from both outside and inside an
organization's network by assisting in making sound decisions regarding the allocation of
computer security resources. Using IDSs in this manner is important, as many people
mistakenly deny that anyone (outsider or insider) would be interested in breaking into
their networks. Furthermore, the information that IDSs give you regarding the source and
nature of attacks allows one to make decisions regarding security strategy driven by
demonstrated need, not guesswork or folklore.
When IDSs run over a period of time, patterns of system usage and detected problems
can become apparent. These can highlight flaws in the design and management of
security for the system, in a fashion that supports security management correcting those
deficiencies before they cause an incident. Even when IDSs are not able to block attacks,
they can still collect relevant, detailed, and trustworthy information about the attack that
supports incident handling and recovery efforts. Furthermore, this information can, under
certain circumstances, enable and support criminal or civil legal remedies. Ultimately,
such information can identify problem areas in the organization's security configuration
or policy.
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There are several types of IDSs available today, characterized by different monitoring
and analysis approaches [1]. Each approach has distinct advantages and disadvantages.
Furthermore, all approaches can be described in terms of a generic process model for
IDSs. Many IDSs can be described in terms of three fundamental functional components:
• Information Sources — the different sources of event information used to
determine whether an intrusion has taken place. These sources can be drawn from
different levels of the system, with network, host, and application monitoring
most common.
• Analysis — the part of intrusion detection systems that actually organizes and
makes sense of the events derived from the information sources, deciding when
those events indicate that intrusions are occurring or have already taken place.
The most common analysis approaches are misuse detection and anomaly
detection.
• Response — the set of actions that the system takes once it detects intrusions.
These are typically grouped into active and passive measures, with active
measures involving some automated intervention on the part of the system, and
passive measures involving reporting IDS findings to humans, who are then
expected to take action based on those reports.
There are several design approaches used in Intrusion Detection. These drive the
features provided by a specific IDS and determine the detection capabilities for that
system. For those who must evaluate different IDS candidates for a given system
environment, these approaches can help them determine what goals are best addressed by
each IDS. The architecture of an IDS refers to how the functional components of the IDS
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are arranged with respect to each other. The primary architectural components are the
Host, the system on which the IDS software runs, and the Target, the system that the IDS
is monitoring for problems.
In early days of IDSs, most IDSs ran on the systems they protected. This was due to
the fact that most systems were mainframe systems, and the cost of computers made a
separate IDS system a costly extravagance. This presented a problem from a security
point of view, as any attacker that successfully attacked the target system could simply
disable the IDS as an integral portion of the attack.
With the advent of workstations and personal computers, most IDS architects moved
towards running the IDS control and analysis systems on a separate system, hence
separating the IDS host and target systems. This improved the security of the IDS as this
made it much easier to hide the existence of the IDS from attackers. Although there are
many goals associated with security mechanisms in general, there are two overarching
goals usually stated for intrusion detection systems — Accountability and Response.
Accountability is the capability to link a given activity or event back to the party
responsible for initiating it [1]. This is essential in cases where one wishes to bring
criminal charges against an attacker. The goal statement associated with accountability is:
"I can deal with security attacks that occur on my systems as long as I know who did it
and where to find them." Accountability is difficult in TCP/IP networks, where the
protocols allow attackers to forge the identity of source addresses or other source
identifiers. It is also extremely difficult to enforce accountability in any system that
employs weak identification and authentication mechanisms.
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Response is the capability to recognize a given activity or event as an attack and then
taking action to block or otherwise affect its ultimate goal [1]. The goal statement
associated with response is "I don't care who attacks my system as long as I can
recognize that the attack is taking place and block it." Note that the requirements of
detection are quite different for response than for accountability. Control Strategy
describes how the elements of an IDS are controlled, and furthermore, how the input and
output of the IDS are managed. They are outlined below:
Centralized — Under centralized control strategies, all monitoring, detection and
reporting are controlled directly from a central location
Interval-Based (Batch Mode) — In interval-based IDSs, the information that flows from
monitoring points to analysis engines is not continuous. In effect, the information is
handled in a fashion similar to "store and forward" communications schemes. Many early
host-based IDSs used this timing scheme, as they relied on operating system audit trails,
which were generated as files. Interval-based IDSs are precluded from performing active
responses.
Real-Time (Continuous) — Real-time IDSs operate on continuous information feeds
from information sources. This is the predominant timing scheme for network-based
IDSs, which gather information from network traffic streams. Here, the term "real-time"
is used as it is used in process control situations. This means that detection performed by
a "real-time" IDS yields results quickly enough to allow the IDS to take action that
affects the progress of the detected attack.
Information Sources — The most common way to classify IDSs is to group them by
information source. Some IDSs analyze network packets, captured from network
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backbones or segments, to find attackers. Other IDSs analyze information sources
generated by the operating system or application software for signs of intrusion.
The majority of commercial intrusion detection systems are Network-based.
These IDSs detect attacks by capturing and analyzing network packets [1]. Listening on a
network segment or switch, one network-based IDS can monitor the network traffic
affecting multiple hosts that are connected to the network segment, thereby protecting
those hosts. Network-based IDSs often consist of a set of single-purpose sensors or hosts
placed at various points in a network. These units monitor network traffic, performing
local analysis of that traffic and reporting attacks to a central management console. As
the sensors are limited to running the IDS, they can be more easily secured against attack.
Many of these sensors are designed to run in "stealth" mode, in order to make it more
difficult for an attacker to determine their presence and location. The advantages of
Network-Based IDSs are as follows:
• A few well-placed network-based IDSs can monitor a large network.
• The deployment of network-based IDSs has little impact upon an existing
network. Network-based IDSs are usually passive devices that listen on a network
wire without interfering with the normal operation of a network. Thus, it is
usually easy to retrofit a network to include network-based. IDSs with minimal
effort.
• Network-based IDSs can be made very secure against attack and even made
invisible to many attackers.
The disadvantages of Network-Based IDSs are [I]:
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• Network-based IDSs may have difficulty processing all packets in a large or busy
network and, therefore, may fail to recognize an attack launched during periods of
high traffic. Some vendors are attempting to solve this problem by implementing
IDSs completely in hardware, which is much faster. The need to analyze packets
quickly also forces vendors to both detect fewer attacks and also detect attacks
with as little computing resource as possible that can reduce detection
effectiveness.
• Many of the advantages of network-based IDSs don't apply to more modern
switch-based networks. Switches subdivide networks into many small segments
(usually one fast Ethernet wire per host) and provide dedicated links between
hosts serviced by the same switch. Most switches do not provide universal
monitoring ports and this limits the monitoring range of a network-based IDS
sensor to a single host. Even when switches provide such monitoring ports, often
the single port cannot mirror all traffic traversing the switch.
• Network-based IDSs cannot analyze encrypted information. This problem is
increasing as more organizations (and attackers) use virtual private networks.
• Most network-based IDSs cannot tell whether or not an attack was successful;
they can only discern that an attack was initiated. This means that after a
network-based IDS detects an attack, administrators must manually investigate
each attacked host to determine whether it was indeed penetrated.
• Some network-based IDSs have problems dealing with network-based attacks that
involve fragmenting packets. These malformed packets cause the IDSs to become
unstable and crash.
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Host-based IDSs operate on information collected from within an individual
computer system. (Note that application-based IDSs are actually a subset of host-based
IDSs.) This vantage point allows host-based IDSs to analyze activities with great
reliability and precision, determining exactly which processes and users are involved in a
particular attack on the operating system. Furthermore, unlike network-based IDSs, host-
based IDSs can "see" the outcome of an attempted attack, as they can directly access and
monitor the data files and system processes usually targeted by attacks. Host-based IDSs
normally utilize information sources of two types, operating system audit trails, and
system logs. Operating system (OS) audit trails are usually generated at the innermost
(kernel) level of the operating system, and are therefore more detailed and better
protected than system logs. However, system logs are much less obtuse and much smaller
than audit trails, and are furthermore far easier to comprehend. Some host-based IDSs are
designed to support a centralized IDS management and reporting infrastructure that can
allow a single management console to track many hosts. Others generate messages in
formats that are compatible with network management systems. The advantages are [I]:
• Host-based IDSs, with their ability to monitor events local to a host, can detect
attacks that cannot be seen by a network-based IDS.
• Host-based IDSs can often operate in an environment in which network traffic is
encrypted, when the host-based information sources are generated before data is
encrypted and/or after the data is decrypted at the destination host
• Host-based IDSs are unaffected by switched networks.
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• When Host-based IDSs operate on OS audit trails, they can help detect Trojan
Horse or other attacks that involve software integrity breaches. These appear as
inconsistencies in process execution.
The disadvantages are [1]:
• Host-based IDSs are harder to manage, as information must be configured and
managed for every host monitored.
• Since at least the information sources (and sometimes part of the analysis engines)
for host-based IDSs reside on the host targeted by attacks, the IDS may be
attacked and disabled as part of the attack.
• Host-based IDSs are not well suited for detecting network scans or other such
surveillance that targets an entire network, because the IDS only sees those
network packets received by its host.
• Host-based IDSs can be disabled by certain denial-of-service attacks.
• When host-based IDSs use operating system audit trails as an information source,
the amount of information can be immense, requiring additional local storage on
the system.
• Host-based IDSs use the computing resources of the hosts they are monitoring,
therefore inflicting a performance cost on the monitored systems.
Application-based IDSs are a special subset of host-based IDSs that analyze the
events transpiring within a software application [1]. The most common information
sources used by application-based IDSs are the application's transaction log files. The
ability to interface with the application directly, with significant domain or application-
specific knowledge included in the analysis engine, allows application-based IDSs to
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detect suspicious behavior due to authorized users exceeding their authorization. This is
because such problems are more likely to appear in the interaction between the user, the
data, and the application.
The advantages are [1]:
• Application-based IDSs can monitor the interaction between user and application,
which often allows them to trace unauthorized activity to individual users.
• Application-based IDSs can often work in encrypted environments, since they
interface with the application at transaction endpoints, where information is
presented to users in unencrypted form.
The disadvantages are [1]:
• Application-based IDSs may be more vulnerable than host-based IDSs to attacks
as the applications logs are not as well protected as the operating system audit
trails used for host-based IDSs.
• As Application-based IDSs often monitor events at the user level of abstraction,
they usually cannot detect Trojan Horse or other such software tampering attacks.
Therefore, it is advisable to use an Application-based IDS in combination with
Host-based and/or Network-based IDSs.
There are two primary approaches to analyzing events to detect attacks: misuse
detection and anomaly detection [1]. Misuse detection, in which the analysis targets
something known to be "bad", is the technique used by most commercial systems.
Anomaly detection, in which the analysis looks for abnormal patterns of activity, has
been, and continues to be, the subject of a great deal of research. Anomaly detection is
used in limited form by a number of IDSs. There are strengths and weaknesses associated
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with each approach, and it appears that the most effective IDSs use mostly misuse
detection methods with a smattering of anomaly detection components.
Misuse detectors analyze system activity, looking for events or sets of events that
match a predefined pattern of events that describe a known attack [1]. As the patterns
corresponding to known attacks are called signatures, misuse detection is sometimes
called "signature-based detection." The most common form of misuse detection used in
commercial products specifies each pattern of events corresponding to an attack as a
separate signature. However, there are more sophisticated approaches to doing misuse
detection (called "state-based" analysis techniques) that can leverage a single signature to
detect groups of attacks.
The advantages are [1]:
• Misuse detectors are very effective at detecting attacks without generating an
overwhelming number of false alarms.
• Misuse detectors can quickly and reliably diagnose the use of a specific attack
tool or technique. This can help security managers prioritize corrective measures.
• Misuse detectors can allow system managers, regardless of their level of security
expertise, to track security problems on their systems, initiating incident handling
procedures.
The disadvantages are [1]:
• Misuse detectors can only detect those attacks they know about — therefore they
must be constantly updated with signatures of new attacks.
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• Many misuse detectors are designed to use tightly defined signatures that prevent
them from detecting variants of common attacks. State-based misuse detectors
can overcome this limitation, but are not commonly used in commercial IDSs.
Anomaly detectors identify abnormal unusual behavior (anomalies) on a host or
network [1]. They function on the assumption that attacks are different from "normal"
(legitimate) activity and can therefore be detected by systems that identify these
differences. Anomaly detectors construct profiles representing normal behavior of users,
hosts, or network connections. These profiles are constructed from historical data
collected over a period of normal operation. The detectors then collect event data and use
a variety of measures to determine when monitored activity deviates from the norm. The
measures and techniques used in anomaly detection include [I]:
• Threshold detection, in which certain attributes of user and system behavior are
expressed in terms of counts, with some level established as permissible. Such
behavior attributes can include the number of files accessed by a user in a given
period of time, the number of failed attempts to login to the system, the amount of
CPU utilized by a process, etc. This level can be static or heuristic (i.e., designed
to change with actual values observed over time).
• Statistical measures, both parametric, where the distribution of the profiled
attributes is assumed to fit a particular pattern, and non-parametric, where the
distribution of the profiled attributes is "learned" from a set of historical values,
observed over time.
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• Rule-based measures, which are similar to non-parametric statistical measures in
that observed data defines acceptable usage patterns, but differs in that those
patterns are specified as rules, not numeric quantities.
• Other measures include neural networks, genetic algorithms, and immune system
models.
Only the first two measures are used in current commercial IDSs. Unfortunately,
anomaly detectors and the IDSs based on them often produce a large number of false
alarms, as normal patterns of user and system behavior can vary wildly. Despite this
shortcoming, researchers assert that anomaly-based IDSs are able to detect new attack
forms, unlike signature-based IDSs that rely on matching patterns of past attacks.
Furthermore, some forms of anomaly detection produce output that can in turn be used as
information sources for misuse detectors. For example, a threshold-based anomaly
detector can generate a figure representing the "normal" number of files accessed by a
particular user; the misuse detector can use this figure as part of a detection signature that
says "if the number of files accessed by this user exceeds this "normal" figure by ten
percent, trigger an alarm." Although some commercial IDSs include limited forms of
anomaly detection, few, if any, rely solely on this technology. The anomaly detection
that exists in commercial systems usually revolves around detecting network or port
scanning. However, anomaly detection remains an active intrusion detection research
area and may play a greater part in future IDSs.
The advantages are [1]:
• IDSs based on anomaly detection detect unusual behavior and thus have the
ability to detect symptoms of attacks without specific knowledge of details.
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• Anomaly detectors can produce information that can in turn be used to define
signatures for misuse detectors.
The disadvantages are [11:
• Anomaly detection approaches usually produce a large number of false alarms
due to the unpredictable behaviors of users and networks.
• Anomaly detection approaches often require extensive "training sets" of system
event records in order to characterize normal behavior patterns.
Once IDSs have obtained event information and analyzed it to find symptoms of
attacks, they generate responses. Some of these responses involve reporting results and
findings to a pre-specified location. Others involve more active automated responses.
Though researchers are tempted to underrate the importance of good response functions
in IDSs, they are actually very important. Commercial IDSs support a wide range of
response options, often categorized as active responses, passive responses, or some
mixture of the two. This thesis does not consider any response system after detecting a
compromised node in a wireless sensor network. However, they are paramount in all
Intrusion Detection Systems!
2.2 IDS Constraints in Wired versus Wireless Mediums
The above explanation on the ingredients of a full-fledged IDS is suited for both wired
and wireless networks. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, the wireless channels are
quite erratic. The channel parameters are extremely dynamic and unpredictable.
Therefore the approaches used to study wireless sensor network security are often a
subset of the above explanation due to the unpredictable channel and the resource-
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constrained sensors. Therefore, it suffices to say the main contributor to the difference
between an IDS on a wired network and a wireless network is the medium. The medium
dictates the hardware architecture, routing protocol, security algorithm, energy limitation,
bandwidth utilization and signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). From Table 2.1 one can clearly
conclude that the small sensor node can only accommodate a small IDS system while the
workstation can accommodate a large and complex IDS.
Table 2.1 Comparison of a Smartdust Sensor with a Workstation
Parameters Smartdust Sensor Typical Workstation
CPU 8 bit, 4 MHz 32 bit, 2 GHz
Storage Flash Memory 8 KB instruction flash 64 KB
RAM 512 bytes 256 MB
EEPROM/ROM 512 bytes 20 GB hard drive
Communication 916 MHz radio 100 Mbps Ethernet link
Bandwidth 10 Kbps 100 Mbps Ethernet link
Operating System TinyOS Linux, NT
OS code space 3500 bytes
~
 64 MB
Available code space 4500 bytes  128 MB
Routing Protocol LEACH RIP
Energy Limitation AA battery 3.5 V AC power supply 120 V
SNR Bad Not a factor
Security Algorithm μTESLA RSA
LEACH — Low Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy	 RIP — Routing Information Protocol
μTESLA — Micro Timed Efficient Streaming Loss-tolerant Authentication
RSA — Public-key algorithm developed by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman
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2.3 Summary
The type of IDS used in this thesis research was a Network-based IDS. The analysis
employed was the Anomaly Detection. The data was studied using a combination of the
Threshold and Statistical detection analysis methods. In a wireless sensor network, the
sensor node capabilities are very inferior to those of a workstation in an Ethernet
network. The unpredictable wireless channel with limited bandwidth and energy were
simulated using a Linux software switch. However, the sensor nodes were simulated
with workstations. Thus, all of the sensor's constraints listed in Table 2.1 were not
considered. The main constraints considered included bandwidth, packets dropped,
packets transmitted and packets received. These parameters can be used to indirectly
calculate the energy associated with the captured data in the future.
CHAPTER 3
SENSOR NETWORKS
3.1 Types of Sensor Networks
During the past two decades, there has been an unprecedented growth in the number of
products and services, which utilize information gained by monitoring and measuring
using different types of sensors. Sensors monitor and quantify parameters under
investigation. A sensor responds to an input quantity by generating a functionally related
output usually in the form of an electrical or optical signal.
The development of sensors to meet the need is referred to as sensor technology.
This technology is used to configure sensor networks of different shapes and sizes. The
type of network depends heavily on the type of application running on the sensor nodes.
Sensing principles include, but are not limited to mechanical, chemical, thermal,
electrical, chromatographic, magnetic, biological, fluidic, optical, ultrasonic and mass
sensing.
Sensors may be exposed to hostile environments. They may be incorporated in
mobile robotic systems, or integral to manufacturing systems. Their environment may
include high temperatures, high vibration, high noise, or corrosive chemicals. In
biological systems, the sensors themselves must not adversely affect the system or
organism. Sensor networks are comprised of hundreds to thousands of nodes, where each
node is a sensor. These sensor nodes co-operate to carry out some task. These are used to
guide as well as control data collection and aggregation. These nodes may be organized
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in clusters such that a locally occurring event can be detected by most of, if not all, the
nodes in a cluster. Each node will have sufficient processing power to make a decision,
and it will be able to broadcast this decision to the other nodes in the cluster. One node
may act as the cluster master, and it may also contain a longer-range radio using a
protocol such as IEEE 802.11 or Bluetooth [2].
Two ways to classify sensor networks are whether or not the nodes are
individually addressable, and whether the data in the network is aggregated. The
following paragraphs give various sensor network applications. These widely varying
sensor applications provide an in-depth insight into the different types of IDSs needed to
provide security. Each application is bolded followed by a description.
Bunker Mapping: This can be used in the military field when trying to find out
about underground facility that has been constructed [2]. The geometry of the facility is
unknown, in terms of size, depth, and shape. Vehicles enter and exit the facility on a
fairly regular basis. In this case, the requirement is to determine the geometry of the
underground facility.
A small passive measurement device (Mote) is attached to a vehicle before it
enters the facility. It later downloads the sensor data later. This is used to reconstruct
part of the internal structure of facility. With multiple data sets, a comprehensive map of
the internals of the facility is constructed. Either radio frequency (RF) or line-of-sight
optical communication to some local retransmitter downloads the sensor data. The Mote
may be placed manually, which is considered the best chance for hiding it, and
guaranteeing any alignment that may be necessary. On the other hand it would be most
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risky. It may also be delivered in a ballistic way, by firing the Mote from a gun of some
kind.
The following combination of sensors, a three-axis accelerometer, three-axis gyro,
and three-axis magnetometer together with a microprocessor, bi-directional RF
communication, and power supply can be built on a Mote in a volume of less than one
cubic inch. This is probably small enough to be used under some circumstances. As for
the power requirements, even with existing off-the-shelf components, it would give a
lifetime of days to months depending on duty cycle. The sensor nodes could be
augmented with a variety of other sensors, such as an image sensor. In addition,
integration of the image compression circuitry with the imager would make for a small,
lower power system.
Dynamically Placed Intrusion Sensor Networks: Military units clearing urban
terrain must clear a building, but cannot afford to leave people behind to ensure that it
stays cleared [2]. The goal is to notify the force if anyone enters the cleared portion of the
building after they have left. Soldiers would a dispenser, possibly attaching it to their
weapons, filled with sensor nodes that could be shot or emplaced quickly by hand on a
wall, stairwell, or doorway. The sensors, using some combination of acoustic, infrared,
visual, or vibration signals would pass information about intruders to the appropriate
person.
The scenario of sensing would use the soldier's voice message as he put the
sensor node. This would be thee verbal message that would be relayed to the soldiers
when that sensor detect an intruder. This could be done today with off the shelf
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components in the cubic inch size range. To be militarily useful it would certainly require
substantial modification.
Distributed Surveillance Sensor Network (DSSN): This network program is
used to investigate the applicability of small, inexpensive undersea vehicles to
surveillance applications and submarine connectivity [2]. It is based on the concept of a
fleet of autonomous undersea vehicles, which gather surveillance data and communicate
acoustically. Each occasionally docks at an underwater station to dump its data, recharge
its batteries, receive any new mission instructions and perhaps remain dormant until its
next deployment. The docking station is self powered and is not connected to shore or
ship by communications cable. The massive quantity of accumulated data is retrieved at a
later time by means of a remotely controlled vehicle guided to the docking station by
means of a fiber optic micro-cable (FOMC). The FOMC is the high-bandwidth channel
by which the data is recovered and instructions are downloaded to be disseminated to the
surveillance fleet.
Autonomous Ocean Sampling Network (AOSN): AOSN is a distributed, highly
mobile, adaptive sensor network composed of a mix of autonomous underwater vehicles
(AUV's), which exhibit complementary capabilities [2]. It is developed for oceanographic
characterization. The architecture is very general; hence the mix of AUV's and their
payloads can be optimized for specific mission scenarios, making the concept both highly
flexible and very powerful. The AOSN concept is predicated upon the assumption that
the current geometric growth in signal processing power continues into the future.
Besides its increasing capabilities and driving costs down, this trend ultimately
permits a single hardware device to support multiple applications. For example, digital
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signal processing (DSP) chips are used to compensate for multipath propagation in the
current generation of acoustic modems developed for AOSN. As DSP's become more
capable they will be able to support higher reliable data transfer rates. More importantly,
as increased processor speed becomes commercially available enough signal-processing
capability will eventually exist to permit the extraction of information from the multipath
signals themselves (which are currently only discriminated against). This capability
configures the AUV communications network into huge multi-static active sonar capable
of detecting and localizing anomalies within the volume of seawater supporting the
acoustic propagation paths. In time the same basic hardware, which was originally
employed for data communications, can simultaneously detect mines and submarines in
the water volume --- with only an upgrade in the silicon! This is a striking, but realistic,
example of the effectiveness of selecting a system's architecture to take maximum
advantage of expected technological evolution.
Digital Traffic Pulse Sensor Network: The Traffic Pulse network is the
foundation for all of Mobility Technologies applications [2]. This network uses a process
of data collection, data processing, and data distribution to generate the most unique
traffic information in the industry. Digital Traffic Pulse collects data through a sensor
network, processes and stores the data in a data center, and distributes that data through a
wide range of applications. In these applications the sensor network is the one that
comprises the core of Digital Traffic Pulse that combines new and unique digital traffic
gathering technology with proven non-digital traffic gathering techniques.
Installed along major highways, the digital sensor network gathers lane-by-lane
data on travel speeds, lane occupancy, and vehicle counts. These basic data elements
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make it possible to calculate average speeds and travel times. The data is then transmitted
to the data center for reformatting. The network continuously monitors roadway
conditions and provides updates to the data center in real time.
In each city, Mobility Technologies maintains a Traffic Operations Center that
collects and reports on real-time event, construction, and incident data. This information
supplements the data collected from the sensors. Each center produces the information
through a wide range of methods: video, aircraft, mobile units, and monitoring of
emergency and maintenance services frequencies.
A digital sensor system is installed in the public right-of-way to gather lane-by-
lane travel speeds, lane occupancy and vehicle counts that produce point-to-point travel
times. The digital data is supplemented with real-time event, construction, and incident
reports that are produced using traditional traffic gathering methods. The data sources
include video images, aircraft, mobile Units, police and emergency frequencies, other
information, public agency information, construction alerts, port information, weather
information and transit information.
The traffic data is combined and processed into real-time information for
immediate distribution. The data is also archived for eventual use in historical and
predictive analyses. The digital traffic information is combined with its traditional
incident and event information and transmitted to the National Transportation Data
Center (NTDC), the heart of the Traffic Pulse system. The data is then converted into
real-time information for immediate distribution and also stored for historical and
predictive analysis.
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The data is sent to the NTDC every 60 seconds. The data is instantly processed
and made immediately available customers via the Internet. This information is also
stored in an Archive Database where it is combined with the geo-located traditional
incident and event information, all highly valuable for data mining purposes. The NTDC
is the commercial grade data center where real-time traffic information is processed and
historical traffic information are archived into a database. Located in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, this multi-tiered architecture provides a highly scalable and flexible
platform on which products and services are based.
Using the Internet, superior traffic information is provided to the public via its
consumer website at www.traffic.com. Eventually, commuters will be able to create
custom commuter profiles and request that their traffic information is sent to them upon
demand. Commuters access the superior, real-time traffic reports via radio and television
stations across the country.
The intelligent transportation systems provide real-time and archived traffic
information to public agencies for the purposes of traffic management, planning, and
reporting. The process of developing in-vehicle traffic solutions for both the personal
commuter (Telematics) and commercial fleet customers (Enterprise Solutions) are in
progress. Commuters will be able to receive real-time, customized traffic updates through
their cell phones, PDAs, pagers, and other wireless devices in the very near future.
Wireless Sensor Networks for Habitat Monitoring: This deployment of sensors
construct a network that consists of many nodes on a monitored landscape, streaming
useful live data onto a computer [2]. This application-driven design exercise serves to
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identify important areas of further work in data sampling, communications, network re-
tasking, and health monitoring.
Habitat and environmental monitoring represent a class of sensor network
applications with enormous potential benefits for scientific communities and society as a
whole. Supplying natural spaces with numerous networked micro-sensors can enable
long-term data collection at scales and resolutions that are difficult, if not impossible, to
obtain otherwise. The intimate connection with its immediate physical environment
allows each sensor to provide localized measurements and detailed information that is
hard to obtain through traditional instrumentation. The integration of local processing and
storage allows sensor nodes to perform complex filtering and triggering functions, as well
as to apply application-specific or sensor-specific data compression algorithms.
The ability to communicate not only allows information and control to be
communicated across the network of nodes, but nodes to cooperate in performing more
complex tasks, like statistical sampling, data aggregation, and system health and status
monitoring. Increased power efficiency gives applications flexibility in resolving
fundamental design tradeoffs, e.g., between sampling rates and battery lifetimes. Low-
power radios with well-designed protocol stacks allow generalized communications
among network nodes, rather than point-to-point telemetry. The computing and
networking capabilities allow sensor networks to be reprogrammed or retasked after
deployment in the field. Nodes have the ability to adapt their operation over time in
response to changes in the environment, the condition of the sensor network itself, or the
scientific endeavor. Architecture that interconnects the core system components ranging
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from very localized collections of sensor nodes to the area of study to the wide-area
where data is ultimately analyzed.
Sensor networks represent a significant advance over traditional invasive methods
of monitoring. Sensors can be deployed prior to the onset of the breeding season or other
sensitive period (in the case of animals) or while plants are dormant or the ground is
frozen (in the case of botanical studies). Sensors can be deployed on small islets where it
would be unsafe or unwise to repeatedly attempt field studies. The results of wireless
sensor-based monitoring efforts can be compared with previous studies that have
traditionally ignored or discounted disturbance effects. Finally, sensor network
deployment may represent a substantially more economical method for conducting long-
term studies than traditional personnel-rich methods.
The sensor networks must be accessible via the Internet. An essential aspect of
habitat monitoring applications is the ability to support remote interactions. Field station
needs resources to host Internet connectivity and database systems. A second tier of
wireless networking provides connectivity to multiple patches of sensor networks
deployed at each of the areas of interest. Three to four patches of 100 static (not mobile)
nodes are sufficient to start.
Sensor networks that run for 9 months from non-rechargeable power sources
would be required. Although ecological studies span multiple field seasons, individual
field seasons typically vary from 9 to 12 months. Every level of the network must operate
with bounded energy supplies. Although renewable energy, for example solar power,
may be available at some locations, disconnected operation remains a possibility.
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The remoteness of the field sites requires the ability to monitor and manage
sensor networks over the Internet. The goal is zero on-site presence for maintenance and
administration during the field season, except for installation and removal of nodes since
Habitat monitoring infrastructure should not disrupt the natural processes or behaviors
under study. Local interactions are required during initial deployment, during
maintenance tasks, as well as during on-site visits. It is critical that sensor networks
exhibit stable, predictable, and repeatable behavior whenever possible. An unpredictable
system is difficult to debug and maintain. Archiving sensor readings for off-line data
mining and analysis are essential. The reliable off loading of sensor logs to databases in
the wired, powered infrastructure is an essential capability. The timely delivery of fresh
sensor data is a key. Nodal data summaries and periodic health-and-status monitoring
requires timely delivery.
The architecture of the sensor networks is a tiered architecture. Lowest level
consists of the sensor nodes that perform general purpose computing and networking in
addition to application—specific sensing. Autonomous sensor nodes provide the lowest
level of the sensing application. These small, battery-powered devices are placed in areas
of interest. Each sensor node collects environmental data primarily about its immediate
surroundings. The sensors can often be built using small and inexpensive individual
sensors. The gateway is responsible for transmitting sensor data from the sensor patch
through a local transit network to the remote base station that provides WAN (wide area
network) connectivity and data logging.
The base station connects to database replicas across the Internet. The data is
displayed to scientists through a user interface. Mobile devices may interact with any of
35
the networks, whether they are used in the field or across the world connected to a
database replica. They can directly communicate with the sensor patch, provide the user
with a fresh set of readings about the environment and monitors the network. While they
will typically not take custody of any data, it allows the user to interactively control the
network parameters by adjusting the sampling rates, power management parameters and
other network parameters.
Compared with traditional data logging systems, networked sensors offer two
major advantages. They can be retasked in the field and they can easily communicate
with the rest of the system. This happens via communication between individual sensors
and coordination with one another. The sensors will typically form a multi-hop network
by forwarding each other's messages, which vastly extends connectivity options.
Bringing direct wide area connectivity to each sensor path is not feasible because
of the cost of equipment. It requires too much power and the installation of all required
equipment is quite intrusive to the habitat. Instead, the wide area connectivity is brought
to a base station where adequate power and housing for the equipment is provided.
Communication between the base station and the sensor patch will be via a wireless local
area network. Wireless networks are particularly advantageous since often each habitat
involves monitoring several particularly interesting areas, each with its own dedicated
sensor patch.
The sensors must be chosen carefully to ensure high interchangeability and high
accuracy. Each sensor has less than 3% variation when interchanged with others of the
same model [2]. The accuracy of each sensor is within 3% of the actual value. The
sensors can be deployed in the field quicker since little or no calibration is needed prior to
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deployment. Another key aspect of choosing a sensor is its startup time. The start up time
is the time a sensor must be powered before its reading stabilizes. Sensors with long start
up times require current for a longer period of time, resulting in higher power
consumption. Minimizing start-up time yields more power per day to perform other tasks,
such as routing and communication.
Many habitat-monitoring applications need to run for nine months - the length of
a single field season. Mica runs on a pair of AA batteries, with a typical capacity of 2.5
ampere-hours (Ah). However one can neither use every drop of energy in the batteries
nor are the batteries manufactured with identical capacities from manufacturer to
manufacturer [2]. A conservative estimate will be made that the batteries will be able to
supply 2200 mAh at 3 volts. Assuming the system will operate uniformly over the
deployment period, each node has 8.148 mAh per day available for use. The application
chooses how to allocate this energy budget between sleep modes, sensing, local
calculations and communications. It is noted that since different nodes in the network
have different functions, they also may have very different power requirements. In any
network, there will be some set of power-limited nodes; when these nodes exhaust their
supplies, the network is disconnected and inoperable. Power is to be budgeted with
respect to the energy bottleneck of the network. The baseline lifetime of the node is
determined by the current draw in the Sleep State. Minimizing power in sleep mode
involves turning off the sensors, the radio, and putting the processor into a deep sleep
mode.
Power efficient communication paradigms for habitat monitoring must include a
set of routing algorithms, media access algorithms, and managed hardware access. The
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routing algorithms must be tailored for efficient network communication while
maintaining connectivity when required to source or relay packets. A simple routing
solution for low duty cycle sensor networks is simply broadcasting data to a gateway
during scheduled communication periods. This method is only communicated in one
direction and there is no dependency on surrounding nodes for relaying packets in a
multi-hop manner. The sensor nodes in burrows are transmitting only with a low duty
cycle - they sample about once per second. Accordingly, a multi-hop-scheduled protocol
must be used to collect, aggregate, and communicate data.
Dual Sensor can provide more information and earlier warning for Diabetics [2].
It monitors glucose and insulin levels simultaneously, allowing better management of the
disease. This tiny sensor can be implanted in the human's body. The first device of its
kind to measure the glucose-insulin ratio, it could help predict changes leading to high or
low blood sugar levels. The sensor detects excess glucose while the pump acts as an
artificial pancreas, the organ that produces insulin in the body. Another device known as
an insulin detector estimates the amount of the hormone in the blood. Combining two
types of sensors in such a small device is a complicated task, because Glucose is
measured in the milli-molar range, while insulin is tracked on even smaller nano-molar
levels. Employing methods similar to those used to create existing implants; researchers
designed a needle-shaped sensor that can be implanted in the body where it won't cause
problems.
The next step is testing the device in animals. Researchers hope to halve the size
of the sensor, reducing it to the thickness of 26-gauge wire (about the size of a
hypodermic needle).
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It consist of the following parts [2]:
• Satellite Monitor: A microprocessor-based device incorporating a configurable
screen display for continuous data; icon-based keys for selecting data and
printout; intuitive operator interface and built-in printer. The sensor is calibrated
in the calibration unit.
• Patient Data Module (PDM): Detachable Patient Data Module enables stored
patient data to be transferred with the patient and retains historical patient data
over 24-hour period. It also provides the interface between the sensor and the
monitor.
• Artificial Retina: Currently, smart sensor chips, each with 100 micro-sensors,
have been built for an ex-vivo testing system of a retina. The smart sensor has two
components (1) an integrated circuit (IC) and (2) an array of sensors. The
integrated circuit is a multiplexing chip, operating at 40KHz, with on chip
switches and pads to support a 10x 10 grid of connections. The circuit has both
transmitting and receiving capabilities. Each connection has an aluminum probe
surface where the micro-machined sensor is bonded. This is accomplished by
using a technique called backside bonding, which places an adhesive on the chip
and allows the sensors to be bonded to the chip, with each sensor located on a
probe surface. Before the bonding is done, the entire IC, except the probe areas, is
coated with a biologically inert substance.
Chemical Vapor Sensor System: Artificial neural networks (ANNs) are used in a
wide variety of data processing applications where real-time data analysis and
information extraction is required [2]. One advantage of the neural network approach is
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that most of the intense computation takes place during the training process. Once the
ANN is trained for a particular task, operation is relatively fast and unknown samples can
be rapidly identified in the field. ANNs have been used in a wide variety of applications
related to manufacturing. These applications include process control, quality control,
industrial inspection, optimization, and modeling. There are many real-time (rapid
response) and remote sensing applications that require an inexpensive, compact, and
automated system for identifying an object (e.g., target, chemical, and isotope). Such a
system can be built by combining a sensor array with an ANN.
The quantity and complexity of the data collected by sensor arrays can make
conventional analysis of data difficult. ANNs, which have been used to analyze complex
data and for pattern recognition, could be a better choice for sensor data analysis. A
common approach in sensor analysis is to build an array of sensors, where each sensor in
the array is designed to respond to a specific physical quantity. Here, the number of
sensors must be at least as great as the number of physical quantities being monitored.
When an ANN is combined with a sensor array, the number of detectable physical
quantities is generally greater than the number of sensors.
A sensor array is composed of several sensing elements, where each element
measures a different property of the sensed sample [2]. Each object (e.g., target,
chemical, isotope) presented to the sensor array produces a signature or pattern
characteristic of the object. By presenting many different objects to the sensor array, a
database of signatures can be built up. From this database, training sets and test sets are
generated. These sets are collections of labeled patterns (signatures) representative of the
desired identification mapping. The training sets are used to configure the ANNs. The
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goal of this training is to learn an association between the sensor array patterns and the
labels representing the data.
When a chemical sensor array is combined with an automated data analysis
system (such as an ANN) to identify vapors, it is often referred to as an artificial nose.
Several researchers have developed artificial noses that incorporate ANNs for use in
applications including monitoring food and beverage odors, automated flavor control,
analyzing fuel mixtures, and quantifying individual components in gas mixtures. The
prototyped ANN was constructed as a multi-layer feed forward network and was trained
with the back propagation of error algorithm by using a training set from the sensor
database.
During operation, the sensor array "smells" a vapor, the sensor signals are
digitized and fed into a computer, and the ANN (implemented in software) then identifies
the chemical. This identification time is limited only by the response of the chemical
sensors, but the complete process can be completed with in a few seconds.
Optical Sensor System: This prototype system employs an array of optical
sensors and identifies the composition of chemical dyes in solution [2]. Light is passed
through the dye solution and into an array of seven optical sensors. Each optical sensor
consists of a silicon detector covered by a narrow bandpass interference filter and is
sensitive to a specific wavelength of light in the visible and near-infrared spectrum. The
output of each sensor provides an input to the ANN. By examining the absorption of the
liquid at different wavelengths, the ANN is able to identify and quantify the dyes. Initial
tests with this system are in their infancy.
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Sensor excitation and sensor electronics power requirements are intimately related
to the thermal noise in the sensor itself. In regards to power consumption in
communication systems, there are so many variables that come into play in evaluating
performance of these systems. However, the fundamental limits are again related to
thermal noise. A receiver with a noise bandwidth B, temperature T, and K sensors, the
thermal noise power from the antenna is KTB.
High-Energy Shaker Monitoring: The equipment generates displacements and
accelerations that are capable of shaking sand from huge castings and feeding railroad-car
size loads of coal and lumber across conveyors at a specific rate [2]. As might be
expected, vibratory equipment can induce a small portion of the high-energy load forces
back through its own structural support members. These resonant frequencies with
relatively small amplitudes can produce some vibration within the structure's steel
members, foundations, control panels, and office buildings.
The frequencies and displacements are distributed over the structural machine
members often in complex patterns and can vibrate in characteristic phase relationships
that either add together to increase resonance and the chance of failure, or cancel to
reduce the resonance. As many as eight different members or machines vibrating at once
can produce excessively high destructive internal forces and audible noise. This has to be
minimized or avoid the frequencies and forces both during the machine design phase and
after the machines are installed in the field.
Unwanted forces and frequencies generated in vibrating equipment are most
typically a result of weak support structures, insufficient foundations, and poor soil
conditions under the foundation, city water mains, or just random resonance. Therefore,
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designing methods to provide sufficient structural damping while maintaining the rigidity
necessary to sustain the shock and vibration is a challenge. In order to help determine the
machine geometry as well as the balancing and damping, the initial design undergoes 3D
modeling and the machine runs real-time testing with multiple-channel data acquisition
equipment.
3.2 Sensor Networks IDS Constraints and Proposed Solutions
It is critical that sensor networks exhibit stable, predictable, and repeatable behavior
whenever possible. An unpredictable system is difficult to keep secure, debug and
maintain. However, even in a well-designed predictable network, the security constraints
on sensor networks are still a major topic of discussion. It is difficult to make a sensor
network secure!	 The proposed solutions include traffic encryption key, key
cryptography, threshold cryptography, certificate repository, watchdog and pathrater and
reverse metempsychosis [4]. These techniques are all under research in attempts to
provide security to sensor networks. The problem is, however, there is no "one size fits
all" security measure to formulate and IDS for sensor networks. Sensor networks are too
specific in nature. For example, a habitat sensor network monitoring animals needs an
IDS that supports mobility whilst another network monitoring radiation in the atmosphere
needs a static IDS.
In key cryptography, sensors can only communicate with other sensors that share
the same key [10]. This is important since the sensors communicate by using the
broadcast primitive. Those sensors that possess the same key "hear" the same
broadcasted message. The other wireless nodes will receive such signal as noise. This
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authenticates the data by avoiding information leakage. However, sensors are limited by
their low energy supply and small memory. Therefore, another technique embodies this
phenomenon paying attention to these resource-constrained sensors — traffic encryption
key.
The resource-constrained sensors can only use symmetric cryptography.
Therefore a cluster of these sensors should share a traffic encryption key. The
disadvantage is that once a node malfunctions, forward secrecy is broken. Therefore it is
imperative that sensors are tamper-resistant [4]. Thus traffic encryption key is
insufficient as an IDS.
Zhou proposed the principle of threshold cryptography [4]. A management server
not only has to store its own key pair, but also the public keys of requirement exerted on
the servers which must potentially be specialized nodes in the network, and the overhead
in signing and verifying routing message both in terms of computation and of
communication.
Hubaux expanded Zhou's philosophy by insisting that each node must keep its
own certificate repository. "These repositories store the public certificates the node
themselves issue, and a selected set of certificates issued by the others. The performance
is defined by the probability that any node can obtain and verify the public key of any
other user, using only the local certificate repositories of the two users. The dilemma is:
too many certificates in a sensor node would easily exceed their capacity, yet too few
might greatly impact the performance of the entire network" [4].
The watchdog and pathrater technique uses a watchdog in promiscuous mode that
constantly monitors its neighbors forwarding activity [4]. The pathrater uses the reports
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of the watchdog to rate the transmission reliability of all routes to a particular destination
node. This technique sound very flawless but it uses far too much of the sensor's
resources. It uses a huge amount of energy, thus making it impractical.
Stajano proposed reverse metempsychosis as a way of protecting the keys
embedded in the nodes [4]. The node is put to rest when it is not in use. Then it wakes
up with another set of imprinted keys once it regains normal functionality. When a node
fails to detect the presence of at least n nodes for some time, it would refuse to work or
reset its keys. This method of protecting the keys is energy efficient. However, it does
not address a recovery policy after a compromised node refuses to work. How will one
recover after a compromised node refuses to work? The next section will address this
question in attempt to describe a policy proposed by Dr. Constantine Manikopoulos and
Ling Li — "the Neighborhood Watch" concept.
3.3 Neighborhood Watch IDS
It has already been established that the wireless environment is very unpredictable. This
makes it very difficult to construct an IDS to protect these wireless sensor networks.
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) provides security engineers with two major
challenges [7]:
• There is no node playing a central role.
• It is very difficult to handle a compromised node.
A wired network has a server acting as a central node. In this instance, central services
like naming services, certification authorities and network-based intrusion detection
provide security. These are impractical to secure MANETs. Each MANET node
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operates while not trusting any of its peers [7]. This gives each node the flexibility of
deciding whether it should communicate with any of its peers. For example, if node A
believes that node B is under attack, node A can choose to not communicate with node B
simply because it already does not trust node B. This complicates and even inhibits
security services because no one can tell if node A or B is acting appropriately. The
solution to this problem is a Neighborhood Watch technology.
Two nodes are neighbors if they can communicate with each other. The
Neighborhood Watch IDS works in conjunction with a host IDS running on each sensor
node. Therefore, each node can detect an attack based on its own embedded IDS. For
example, an escalation of privilege may hijack a node that detects it. The problem then is
how will this information be processed to alert the other nodes of the attacked node?
How will the entire network respond to such a change? The Neighborhood Watch
attempts to answer these question be providing a recovery policy from such security
breaches.
The following example explains how this works. As mentioned before, all nodes
broadcast messages and the nodes in range with the appropriate key receive the messages.
Thus in the Neighborhood Watch technology a status update message, IDS_Status, is
broadcast periodically or triggered by an event [7]. The nodes within communicating
range of each other will receive and respond to this message. Now suppose node A is
compromised by means of a security breach. Then all neighboring nodes to node A will
process this same data leading to identically valid evaluation of the security status of
node A. Suppose there are five nodes, including node A, in the neighborhood of node A.
All five nodes will cast an independent vote on the status of node A. Therefore, even if
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node A lies about its status, the majority voting will reveal the truth of the security breach
occurring at node A.
Once node A is revealed as being compromised, the other nodes will make a
decision to delete node A from the network. This is achieved by broadcasting a Delete
(x) message. The network topology and thus its routing will be updated due to the
deletion of node A. Thus by locally "watching" one's "neighborhood" each node can
make a decision of the status of each other's security status. This is referred to as Local
Collaborative Groups (LCGs). Therefore, the Neighborhood Watch IDS works as a
complementary tool to an existing IDS. It detects and deletes a compromised node
thereby recovering the network while avoiding this security breach from spreading
throughout the network.
3.4 Summary
There are many types of sensor networks. Bunker Mapping, Dynamically Placed
Intrusion Sensor Networks, Distributed Surveillance Sensor Network (DSSN),
Autonomous Ocean Sampling Network (AOSN), Digital Traffic Pulse Sensor Network,
Wireless Sensor Networks for Habitat Monitoring and Chemical Vapor Sensor System
are various examples of sensor networks. The applications monitor events on land, in the
sea, in the air, in plants and in animals. The actual network employed depends on the
type of applications needed to monitor the physical quantity being measured. The
security method varies with the type of network.
There is no "one size fits all" security measure that will protect all the networks
described. However, once one understands the network and the measure of security
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needed, one can employ a strategy comprising of one or more of the security method
proposed throughout this Chapter. Techniques like traffic encryption key, key
cryptography, threshold cryptography, certificate repository, watchdog and pathrater, and
reverse metempsychosis all have different shortfalls. The Neighborhood Watch IDS can
be used in conjunction with the other proposed solutions to arrive at the level of security




4.1 Dynamic Switch Emulation Tool
Wireless mobile ad hoc networks differ from wired networks in that their topologies are
highly dynamic and their links can have a relatively high error bit rate. These properties
make it difficult to conduct controlled repeatable experiments for security engineers to
study and research wireless ad hoc networks [5]. The Dynamic Switch Emulation Tool is
a software that connects multiple unaltered hosts according to a controllable dynamic
topology with a controllable bit error rate on the links. This switch emulates a wireless
mobile network using standard Ethernet physical connections. This allows the study of
security in a controlled environment!
4.1.1 Architecture and Leaky Bucket Model
The architecture of the Dynamic Switch hinges on the recompilation of Redhat Linux 7.0
kernel 2.2.16 [5]. The Dynamic Switch kernel modifies the communication protocol to
that of a wireless nature while using its wired counterpart. A wired network is easy and
inexpensive to construct in a laboratory. A MANET, on the other hand, is time
consuming and expensive to set up. Therefore, the Switch provides the inexpensiveness
of a wired network with wireless properties. The low bit error rate and high data rate in a
wired network does not match the MANET environment. The Switch emulates higher bit
error rates and low data rate using the wired connections. Traditional wired switches use
the medium access control (MAC) and Internet protocol (EP) addressing information to
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forward packets. However, the Dynamic Switch uses just the interface card to forward
packets from one node to another. It is sometimes referred to as the IP/MAC killer!
The basic concept of the Dynamic Switch is to use a star topology to connect
multiple nodes with the Switch acting as the central hub [5]. The mobile nodes can run
any software provided it has the appropriate interface card. The Switch runs on a
standard PC. It has multiple network interface cards (NICs) and or multiple ports
interface cards. Each connection to an interface card and or port represents a node on the
wireless network. The Dynamic Switch can switch between any set of connected hosts
based on a local switching connectivity table. It is transparent to all the nodes on the
network at or above the MAC layer. All incoming frames are switched based solely on
the connectivity table and the interface card. The switch adds no address information to
the MAC frame or LP datagram.
Figure 4.1.1.1 (a) Dynamic Switch Topology	 (b) Equivalent Wireless Network
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The topology of the wired star network in Figure 4.1.1.1(a) shows four interfaces
connected to the Dynamic Switch. They are denoted eth0, eth1, eth2 and eth3. These
interfaces correspond to the nodes in the wireless equivalent network in Figure 4.1.1.1(b).
This network is created using a simple script. The script to construct such a wireless
topology is:
./process 0 3 up
./process 1 2 up
./process 1 3 up
./process 2 3 up
The first line indicates that the link between interface 0 and interface 3 is up. Thus node
0 and node 3 are within communication range. The rest of the script establishes the links
displayed in Figure 4.1.1.1(b). The Dynamic Switch in the equivalent wireless network
is transparent. Thus the nodes have no knowledge of its existence and can only "see"
those nodes within communication range. The routing protocol used in the Dynamic
Switch is the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR). This is a proactive
protocol. This means that the nodes on the wireless network periodically transmit "hello"
messages and link state changes.
The packet drop rate is high in wireless communication. This is implemented on
the Switch by controlling the pack drop rate on the links. A Gilbert model, a two-state
discrete-time Markov model, was employed to simulate dropping packets. "In the two-
state Markov model a channel can be in one of two possible states, "good" or "bad". The
state transition diagram is shown in Figure 4.1.1.2. The probability of dropping a packet,
that is, the probability of a packet error, is different in each state. PG is the probability of
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dropping a packet while in the good state and PB, PB > PG, is the probability of dropping a
packet while in the bad state. Given a present state, a channel may transfer to the other
state or stay in the present state with certain probabilities. P1 and P2 are transition
probabilities of staying in the good and bad state respectively" [5].
Figure 4.1.1.2 Two-state Markov Chain for Packet Drop Process
One of the limited resources in wireless communication is bandwidth. The
Dynamic Switch implements the Leaky Bucket Token Model to emulate constrained
capacity on the links. In this model there are three controllable parameters. The first is
the size of the bucket, B tokens. The second is the token arrival rate, r tokens per second.
The third is the allowable transmission rate, p, bytes per token. These parameters
contribute to the maximum allowable data rate C by the following formula: C=μxr
bytes per second implemented in the Leaky Bucket Token Model [5].
The Leaky Bucket Token Model forwards a packet only if a token is available in
the token buffer. All packets must have a token to be transmitted. A packet is dropped if
there is no token available. The tokens enter the bucket at the constant rate r tokens per
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second. The outbound traffic is controlled by μ that determines the number of bytes per
token. The correct combination of these three parameters is very tricky. The selection of
r involves a tradeoff between accuracy and overhead [5]. A high token arrival rate r
results in transmissions being spread out over a long interval that more closely resembles
a low data rate link. However, r must be reduced to the minimum timer interval
supported by the operating system of the Switch host to reduce timer interrupt overhead.
Figure 4.1.1.3 shows the relationship of r, μ and B and gives a pictorial explanation of the
mechanism for forwarding and or dropping packets.
Figure 4.1.1.3 Leaky Bucket Token Model
4.1.2 Dynamic Switch Constraints
As mentioned before the operating system timer interrupt overhead posses a constraint on
the Dynamic Switch. Hence, the bandwidth parameter on the Dynamic Switch cannot be
accurately determined. However, the maximum channel capacity C = x r bytes per
second is the best method of correlating the bandwidth utilization. The Switch does not
emulate a wireless MAC layer protocol, so absolute delays and throughput in a MANET
routing protocol cannot be accurately measured since these metrics, certainly in absolute
terms, are sensitive to the performance of the MAC layer. However, using statistics and
doing comparisons of various data sets can give one a good approximation of delays in
the wireless network.
4.1 Simulation Results and Analysis
Figure 4.2.1 Wireless Test Bed
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The simulation experimentations attempted to study the behavior of good nodes
versus bad ones. The Statistical and Threshold Anomaly Detection technique explained
in Chapter 2 was employed. Figure 4.2.1 shows the test bed used to analyze channel
bandwidth utilization and delays in the good nodes and bad node. There were six nodes
fully connected in a wireless network one was also used a base station. Then a client-
server program that simulated self-similar background traffic was installed on each node.
All nodes communicated with the base station. Another faulty client-server program
simulated the bad node's operation. The assumption here is that a good node behaves
different to a bad one. The data was gathered using tcpdump. This data captured
statistics on every packet. This information was extracted from the tcpdump data in 20-
minute time slots. These time slots were studied independently and then averaged over
the entire time. The final results were graphed in Microsoft Excel. The graphical
representations are explained below. The overall objective was to detect the faulty node
based on the statistical difference and a threshold value.
Figure 4.2.2 Statistical Delay on Good Node
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The statistical delay on the good node was an average of 0.69 ms while the
standard deviation was 0.49 shown in Figure 4.2.2. This was much better than the delay
on the bad node that was 0.225192 s with a standard deviation of 0.89 shown in Figure
4.2.3. This huge difference in the delay indicates that the faulty node was detected
statistically. A threshold value of 1 ms was chosen. The good node was within this value
about 98 % of the time. The bad node on the other hand was far out of this range and was
definitely detected.
Figure 4.2.3 Statistical Delay on Faulty Node
The channel utilization on the good node was approximately 2000 bytes per
second, shown below in Figure 4.2.4. That for the bad node was about 3750 bytes per
second, shown in Figure 4.2.5. This occurred because the faulty node used up more
bandwidth than any of the good nodes. It constantly communicated with the base station
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since its status was constantly queried. Therefore, the bad node hogged the limited
bandwidth.
Figure 4.2.5 Channel Utilization on Faulty Node
4.2 Summary
The Dynamic Switch was used to emulate a fully connected wireless network with six
nodes and one node acting as a base station. This software uses wired Ethernet links to
emulate wireless channels by allowing interfaces to communicate with each other. The
background client-server software simulated the background traffic while a faulty client-
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server program simulated the faulty node. The data was captured using tcpdump on a
Linux node. These data were analyzed with Microsoft Excel graphing utility. A
statistical study of 20-minute time slots of the data was carried out independently. Then
the statistical average for the good nodes were plotted to give the "normal" behavior of
good nodes. This was compared to the bad node and the results clearly showed that the
faulty node was detected by the Statistical and Threshold Anomaly Detection techniques.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
This thesis never mentioned one of the most important limitations of wireless networks —
energy. There is limited energy supply! This was not mentioned because the study only
took two parameters into consideration. Energy is definitely a parameter that can be
added to the future study of detecting a faulty node in wireless technology. The main
reason it was left out is because energy efficient sensors heavily depend on the type of
routing protocols being used. The Dynamic Switch only used one routing protocol,
OLSR. Therefore, an energy study will be limited to this protocol and will not provide
enough information to make plausible conclusions.
Still, the study of energy in wireless sensor networks should not be ignored.
According to J. L. Gao [3], "energy consumption is one of the most important metrics for
wireless ad hoc sensor networks because it directly relates to the operational lifetime of
the network". These studies, however, concentrate on the trade-offs between low-energy
routing and self-organizing protocols. The creators of the Dynamic Switch are hoping to
add various protocols to the Switch. Once this is completed, one can study energy by
taking each packet size and divide it by the bandwidth. This gives the following:
(bits)/(bits per second) = seconds. Then take the answer in seconds and multiply it by the
battery initial power, giving: (seconds)(joules/second) = joules. Then subtract this energy
from the initial energy repeatedly, packet after packet. Eventually all the energy will be
used up — this is equivalent to the battery's lifespan.
Even though the energy metric was ignored, the thesis still examined two very
important metrics channel utilization and delay. The wired IDS techniques proved to
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be inefficient in the wireless sensor network environment. The wireless sensors are very
resource constrained and cannot support the security algorithms and protocols used in a
wired network. The high bit-error rates, low bandwidth, low transmission rate and high
delays make the wireless channels unpredictable. This makes it difficult to study security
in actual wireless sensor networks since it is very time-consuming and expensive to set
up a test bed. This is true irrespective of the type of wireless sensor network being
studied.
The types of wireless sensor networks monitor various physical quantities on
land, in the air, at the bottom of the ocean, in plants and in animals. For example,
monitoring animals in their natural habitats and monitoring radioactive isotopes in the
atmosphere are two types of wireless sensor networks. These sensor nodes run very
different applications and are exposed to different atmospheric conditions. Therefore,
they demand different approaches for their security. Although some proposals were
made, including cryptography, encryption keys and the Neighborhood Watch techniques,
there is no "one size fits all" security for wireless sensor networks. Each network is too
specific and requires its own attention when implementing an IDS.
The Dynamic Switch solved the problem of setting up a time-consuming and
expensive wireless sensor network but it had it own shortfalls. It emulated a wireless
channel with a wired one. It provides pseudo-wireless capabilities where absolute delays
and operating system timer interrupt overhead were concerns. However, by doing a
Statistical and Threshold Detection analysis, this thesis detected the faulty node among
good ones. The faulty node had much higher delays and much higher channel utilization.
It was definitely detected!
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